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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This Appeal addresses the issues of child custody jurisdiction under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") and personal jurisdiction arising out of a
divorce action. The Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent Claudia Johnson ("Claudia") filed
for divorce in the state of New York on October 5, 2006, where the parties and their children had
resided for approximately eleven (11) years before relocating to Idaho for two and one-half
months. The Plaintifti'Respondent/Cross-Appellant Larry Johnson ("Larry") filed for divorce in
the state of Idaho on October 6, 2006. The magistrate court entered an Order on November 29,
2006, holding that Idaho did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA over child
custody issues. On February 20, 2007, the magistrate subsequently dismissed the remaining
issues raised in Larry's divorce action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8)
because the same issues were being addressed in parallel proceedings in the state of New York.
Larry appealed the February 20, 2007 Order to the district court. The district court reversed both
the November 29, 2006 Order and the February 20, 2007 Order.

Claudia is appealing the

Honorable Stephen W. Drescher's decision reversing the magistrate court.

B.

Course of the Proceedings

Larry filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce on October 6, 2006 in Canyon County,
Idaho. (R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 11.) The day before filing his divorce complaint, Larry was served
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with a Summons and Notice for an Action for Divorce that was filed in Buffalo, New York, by
Claudia. (R., Vol. I, p. 65.)
On October 20, 2006, Larry filed an ex parte Motion for an Order to Show Cause and
Affidavit of Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Order to Show Cause. (R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 717.) The magistrate judge signed the Order to Show Cause that was submitted ex parte and set
the matter for hearing on October 30, 2006. (R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 18-20.)
On October 27, 2006, Claudia filed a Limited Notice of Appearance. (R., Vol. I, p. 1.)
On that same date, Claudia also filed a Motion to Quash Order to Show Cause, Affidavit of
Claudia Johnson and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash Order to Show Cause
Pursuant to the UCCJEA. (R., Vol. I, pp. 12-23.) Larry filed an Affidavit Re: Significant
Connection and Substantial Evidence and a Memorandum Re: Jurisdiction. (R., Supp. Vol. I, pp.
21-57.)
On October 26, 2006, the New York court issued an Order to Show Cause granting
temporary custody of the parties' minor children to Claudia and directing that the children could
not be removed from New York until further order of the court. (R., Vol. I, p. 41-42.) The New
York order was submitted to the Idaho court attached to the Affidavit of Mackenzie E. Whatcott
on November 17, 2006. (R., Vol. I, pp. 39-42.)
The October 30, 2006 hearing date was rescheduled for November 17, 2006. (R., Vol. I,

p. 1.)
On November 13, 2006, Claudia filed a Responding Affidavit Re: Jurisdiction of Claudia
Johnson.

(R. Vol. I, pp. 24-38.)
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On November 17, 2006, Claudia lodged a Supplemental

Memorandum Re: UCCJEA. (R., Vol. I, pp. 43-50.) Larry also filed the Supplemental Affidavit
of Larry C. Johnson. (R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 58-76.)
The magistrate court held a hearing to address Larry's Motion for Order to Show Cause
and Claudia's Motion to Quash on November 17, 2006. (R., Vol. I, p. 51.) The magistrate court
also participated in a telephone conference with the judge assigned to the divorce matter in the
state of New York. (Id.) On November 29, 2006, the magistrate entered an Order finding that
Idaho was not the "home state" under the UCCJEA that New York was the "home state" under
the UCCJEA and declined jurisdiction over custody matters.

(R., Vol. I, pp. 51-52.) The

magistrate further found that New York had more significant contacts than Idaho. (Id.)
On December 18, 2006, Claudia filed a Motion to Dismiss Remaining Issues Pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8). (R., Vol. I, p. 1.) The motion was not scheduled for
hearing. (Id.) On January 11, 2007, Claudia filed Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss and
the Affidavit of Mackenzie Whatcott in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (R., Vol. I,
pp. 53-58.) Claudia provided the magistrate court with an order issued from the New York court
on January 2, 2007, wherein the court ordered that it had jurisdiction over all matters except for

in rem jurisdiction over property in Idaho. (R., Vol. I, pp. 57-58.) The New York order further
provided that Larry's motion to dismiss that had been filed by his attorney in New York was
denied. (Id.)
On February 9, 2007, Larry filed Plaintiffs Objection to the Renewed Motion to Dismiss.
(R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 77-82.) On February 9, 2007, Claudia filed the Supplemental Affidavit of
Mackenzie E. Whatcott attaching an amended order from the New York court that was entered
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,
on February 7, 2007, that clarified that the court had personal jurisdiction over Larry pursuant to
New York's long arm statute. (R., Vol. I, pp. 59-64.) On February 13, 2007, Claudia filed
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to Dismiss. (R., Vol. I, pp. 65-71.) The
magistrate court held a hearing on the renewed motion to dismiss on February 14, 2007. (R. Vol.
I, p. 2.) On February 20, 2007, the magistrate court entered an Order dismissing the remaining
issues pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8). (R., Vol. I, pp. 72-74.)
On March 13, 2007, Larry filed a Notice of Appeal wherein he appealed the February 20,
2007 Order. (R. Vol. I, p. 75-78.) He did not appeal the November 29, 2006 Order regarding
child custody jurisdiction. (Id.)
Larry filed Appellant's Brief on July 6, 2007. (R., Supp., Vol. I, pp. 83-107.) Claudia
filed Respondent's Brief on August 6, 2007. (R. Vol. I., pp. 79-97.) On that same date, Claudia
also filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, the Affidavit of Mackenzie E. Whatcott and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the grounds that Larry's appeal was
moot. (R., Vol. I, pp. 98-108.) Larry filed Appellant's Reply Brief on August 23, 2007. (R.,
Supp. Vol. I, pp. 108-120.)
On November 8, 2007, Larry filed the Affidavit of Larry Johnson and Plaintiffs
Objection and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. (R.,
Supp. Vol. I, pp. 121-133, Supp. Vol. II, pp. 134-140.) Claudia filed Defendant's Response to
Plaintiffs Objection and Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Appeal
on November 13, 2007. (R. Vol. I, pp. 109-115.)
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On January 17, 2008, Larry submitted the Affidavit of Jennifer M. Schindele that
attached the Memorandum entered by the New York court on or about January 10, 2008. (R.,
Supp. Vol. II, pp. 141-150.) The following day, Larry filed a Motion in Affidavit Form for
Extension to Supplement Record and to Remand. (R. Vol. I, p. 4.) On January 25, 2008,
Claudia filed the Affidavit of Mackenzie E. Whatcott. (R. Vol. I, p. 116-123.) The district court
held a hearing on January 29, 2008 and the parties stipulated to allow Mr. Johnson more time to
supplement the record. (R., Vol. I, p. 4.)
On February 5, 2008, Larry filed the Affidavit of James A. Bevis that attached an
affidavit of Keith Kadish, Larry's first New York attorney. (R., Supp. Vol. II, pp. 151-161.)
On March 3, 2008, Larry filed a Motion in Affidavit Form for Extension to Supplement
Record. (R., Vol. I, p. 4.) He also filed the Affidavit of James A. Bevis. (R., Supp. Vol. II, pp.
162-180.) On March 27, 2008, Claudia filed the Affidavit of Mackenzie E. Whatcott which
attached the Judgment After Divorce Trial that was entered in the state of New York. (R., Vol. I,
pp. 124-132.) On March 28, 2008, Larry filed the Affidavit of Roger T. Davison, the New York
attorney he retained after terminating Keith Kadish. (R., Supp. Vol. II, pp. 181-183.)
The hearing on Larry's appeal and Claudia's motion to dismiss the appeal was held on
April 9, 2008. (R. Vol. I, p. 4.) On that same day, Larry also filed the Affidavit of James A.
Bevis. (R., Supp. Vol. II, pp. 184-192.)
The district court issued its Order on Appeal and Motion to Dismiss on May 2, 2008. (R.
Vol. I, p. 133-137.) The district court reversed the magistrate's orders entered on November 29,
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2006 and February 20, 2007 and remanded the matter for reconsideration consistent with this
Court's decision in Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.2d 761 (2007). (R., Vol. I, p. 136.)
On May 5, 2008, Larry filed a Motion for Automatic Disqualification. (R., Vol. I, p. 4.)

'

The Order for Disqualification was entered on May 7, 2008 and the Honorable Debra Orr was
disqualified. (R. Vol. I, p. 4). The Honorable James A. Schiller was assigned as the magistrate.
(/d.)

Claudia filed a Motion to Reconsider, Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider
and Affidavit of Mackenzie E. Whatcott on May 19, 2008. (R. Vol. I, pp. 138-172.) Larry filed
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. (R. Supp. Vol. II,
pp. 193-209.) On June 3, 2008, Claudia filed the Affidavit of Claudia Johnson in Response to
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Defendant's
Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. (R., Vol.
I, p. 173-194.) Larry filed the Affidavit of Larry Johnson in Response to Defendant's Affidavit
Filed on or about June 3, 2008. (R., Supp. Vol. II, pp. 210-220.)
On June 20, 2008, the district court entered its Order on Denying Motion for
Reconsideration. (R. Vol. I, p. 195-196.)
On June 30, 2008, Larry filed a Motion for Temporary Orders and the Affidavit of Larry
C. Johnson. (R., Supp. Vol. II, pp. 221-227.) On July 10, 2008, Claudia filed an Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Orders and Objection to Request for Trial Setting, the Affidavit
of Claudia Johnson in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Orders, and the Affidavit
of Mackenzie E. Whatcott. (R. Vol. I, p. 5.)
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On July 15, 2008, Larry filed Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendant's
Opposition and Objection Filed on or about July 10, 2008. (R., Supp. Vol. II, pp. 228-249.)
Claudia filed the Affidavit of Charles Messina on July 16, 2008. (R. Vol. I, p. 5.)
On July 17, 2008, Claudia filed the Notice of Appeal. (R. Vol. I, pp. 197-201.) On that
same date, the magistrate court heard Larry's Motion for Temporary Orders. (R., Vol. I, p. 5.)
The magistrate court issued its Order Denying Summer Visitation; Order Staying All
Proceedings During Appeal; and Order Certifying Direct and Expedited Appeal on July 22,
2008. (R. Vol. I, pp. 202-207.)
Larry filed his Notice of Cross-Appeal on August 22, 2008. (R., Supp. Vol. II, pp. 250255.)
C.

Statement of Facts

Larry and Claudia were married on June 30, 1984, at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. (R., Vol.
I, p. 173, ,i 2.) Three children were born as issue of the marriage, and two of the children are
under the age of majority. (Id.) The two minor children are
and

born

born
(Id.) The parties and

their children resided in Buffalo, New York, for approximately eleven (11) years prior to Larry
obtaining employment in Idaho.

(R., Vol. I, p. 174, ,i 3.)

Larry traveled to Idaho in

approximately December of 2005 to seek employment and moved to Idaho in January of 2006.
(R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 24, ,i 7.) Claudia and the children continued to live, work, and attend school
in Buffalo, New York. Claudia and the children subsequently followed Larry to Idaho on July
18, 2006. (R., Vol. I, p. 21, ,i 3.) Claudia and the children traveled to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
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on October 3, 2006, and Claudia visited a lawyer in New York and filed for divorce on October
5, 2006. (R., Vol. I, p. 21.)
Larry had previously, throughout the marriage, obtained employment in foreign states
when the family continued to reside in the state of New York and prior thereto when the parties
,

resided in Pennsylvania. (R. Vol. I, p. 27.) Larry resided and worked at one point in New
Orleans, Louisiana for approximately six (6) months. (Id.) On another occasion, he resided and
worked in the state of Michigan for several months. (Id.) It was not uncommon throughout the
course of the marriage for Larry to live in one state and the family to live in another. (Id.)
Claudia was not anxious about relocating to Idaho. (R., Vol. I, p. 26.) Larry unilaterally
began looking for houses and found a home, purchased the home, signed the mortgage and sales
agreement; all done without Claudia's knowledge or consent. (R. Vol. I, p. 27.)
Claudia and the children followed Larry to Idaho on July 18, 2006. (R., Vol. I, p. 21, ,r 3.)
The girls were extremely unhappy in Idaho. (R., Vol. I, p. 28.)

did not eat her lunch

for the first two weeks she was there and had no friends to sit with at lunch or mends to play
with at recess. (Id.)
As set forth above, Claudia and the children returned to Buffalo, New York on October 3,
2006. (R., Vol. I, p. 21,

,r 3.)

Only a few days after arriving in New York, Claudia found that

her access to the parties' Wells Fargo checking and savings accounts, First Niagara checking
accounts, Platinum Visa account, American Express account, Bank of America Platinum Visa
account, Exxon Mobil account, Macy's account and Brook's Brother's account had all been
frozen. (R., Vol. I, p. 25.)
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On October 20, 2006, Larry filed an ex parte Motion for an Order to Show Cause and

l

Affidavit of Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Order to Show Cause in Idaho. (R., Supp. Vol. I,
pp. 7-17.) The magistrate judge signed the Order to Show Cause that was submitted ex parte and

'
,

set the matter for hearing on October 30, 2006. (R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 18-20.) The hearing on
the Order to Show Cause originally scheduled for October 30, 2006, was rescheduled for
November 17, 2006. (R., Vol. I, p. 1.)
On October 26, 2006, the New York court issued an Order to Show Cause granting
temporary custody of the parties' minor children to Claudia and directing that the children could
not be removed from New York until further order of the court. (R., Vol. I, p. 41-42.)
On November 17, 2006, the magistrate court held a hearing to address Larry's Motion for
Order to Show Cause and Claudia's Motion to Quash. (R., Vol. I, p. 51.) The magistrate court
also participated in a telephone conference with the judge assigned to the divorce matter in the
state of New York. (Id.) On November 29, 2006, the magistrate entered an Order finding that
Idaho was not the "home state" under the U CCJEA and that New York was the "home state"
under the UCCJEA and declined jurisdiction over custody matters. (R., Vol. I, pp. 51-52.) The
magistrate further found that New York had more significant contacts than Idaho. (Id.) Larry
did not appeal this determination. (R., Vol. I, pp. 51-52.)
On January 2, 2007, the New York court entered an order denying Larry's motion to
dismiss the divorce action in New York. (R., Vol. I, pp. 57-58.) The New York court also
ordered that it was retaining jurisdiction over the entire case except for "in rem jurisdiction over
any property of the parties which is physically located in the State of Idaho." (Id.) The New

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 919559-00I/365146 SWW/MEW/jib 9/25/2008

York court subsequently issued an amended order on February 7, 2007, finding that it had
personal jurisdiction over Larry pursuant to New York's long ann statute. (R., Vol. I, pp. 5964.) The New York orders were submitted to the magistrate court in Idaho. (Id.)
The magistrate court held a hearing on Claudia's Renewed Motion to Dismiss the
remaining issues in Larry's divorce action on February 14, 2007. (R. Vol. I, p. 2.) On February
20, 2007, the magistrate court entered an Order dismissing the remaining issues pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8). (R., Vol. I, pp. 72-74.)
The Court found that Claudia filed her action first in New York, that the Idaho court was
without subject matter jurisdiction to decide custody matters, and that there was pending
litigation over the same issues in New York:
An order's already issued in New York saying they have
jurisdiction over everything. I did reserve the issue of in rem
jurisdiction which is the only reason I set it out for hearing date is
if we had some hearing on the real property that we had sitting
here.

And what I don't want to happen is to have two courts in
two separate states issuing two separate orders on who has
jurisdiction. If New York doesn't have jurisdiction over you and
this gets set aside, you certainly can come back here and do that.
I believe the 12(b)(8) action does refer to out-of-state pending in another state and I don't want to have two separate
dueling factors.
(R., Supp., Vol. II, p. 176, Tr., pp. 30-31.)

On or about March 13, 2007, Larry filed a Notice of Appeal wherein he appealed the
February 20, 2007 Order to the district court. Larry argued on appeal that the New York court
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didnothavepersonaljurisdictionoverhim. (R., Vol. !,pp. 75-78; Supp. Vol. !,pp. 83-107.) He
did not appeal the November 29, 2006 Order regarding custody jurisdiction. (Id.)
While all of the above litigation was pending in Idaho, litigation continued in New York.
Larry appeared for his divorce trial in New York on November 13 and 14, 2007. (R., Vol. I, pp.
116-132, 155-172.) The parties entered into a stipulated custody schedule on November 13,
2007 and tried other issues before the New York court on November 14, 2007. (R., Vol. I, pp.
157-172.) The New York court issued an order on custody on December 18, 2007. 1 (R., Vol. I,
pp. 157-172.)
Larry retained an attorney by the name of Keith Kadish who entered a limited appearance
in the New York case for the sole purpose of contesting the custody jurisdiction on December 1,
2006. (R., Vol. I, p. 106.) This appearance specifically provides that he was appearing on the
issues of custody and child support. (Id.) Larry never objected to this limited appearance until
Claudia raised the issue on her Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.

Mr. Kadish filed a second

appearance in the New York case, which was a general appearance, on April 20, 2007. (R., Vol.
I, p. 107.) Larry voluntarily subjected himself to the jurisdiction of New York.
Claudia filed the motion to dismiss Larry's appeal on August 6, 2007, on the grounds that
Larry's appeal was moot. (R., Vol. I, pp. 98-108.) Larry's appeal to the district court was based
upon his argument that New York did not have personal jurisdiction over him and therefore the
magistrate should not have relied upon its order when it dismissed the remaining issues in

1

The final Order resolving all issues was entered March 18, 2008, more than a year after the magistrate court issued
its February 20, 2007 and while Larry's appeal was pending before the district court. (R., Vol. I, pp. 126-132.)
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Idaho.2 After Larry filed his appeal to the district court, he entered a general appearance in New
York on April 20, 2007. (R., Vol. I., pp. 107-108.) Therefore, the appeal became moot in light of
the fact that Larry had entered a voluntary appearance in New York. (R., Vol. I, pp. I 04-108.)
On May 2, 2008, the district court entered its Order on Appeal and Motion to Dismiss
wherein the court reversed the November 29, 2006 Order and the February 20, 2007 Order,
citing to this Court's decision in Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 P.3d 761 (2007), and
remanded the case to the magistrate court. (R., Vol. I, pp. 133-37.)
Claudia filed a Motion to Reconsider that was denied on June 20, 2008. (R. Vol. I, p.
195-196.)
On July 17, 2008, Claudia filed the Notice of Appeal. (R. Vol. I, pp. 197-201.) Larry
filed a Cross-Appeal on August 22, 2008. (R., Supp. Vol. I, pp. 250-255.)

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. Did the district court err by reversing the November 20, 2006 Order on child
custody jurisdiction which was an order that was not appealed from and
addressed an issue that was not raised on appeal?
B. Does Idaho have subject matter jurisdiction over custody issues under the
UCCJEA?
C. Did the district court err by reversing the magistrate's dismissal under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8)?
D. Did the district court err by denying the Motion to Dismiss Appeal?

2

Claudia's continues to take the position that the magistrate court did not rely on the New York order as the sole
basis for its dismissal under Rule 12(b)(8) and that Larry's appeal to the district court fails for the reasons set forth
in more detail below.
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III.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review.

Where the issues presented were first decided in the magistrate division and then
presented to the district court on appeal, the Court reviews the magistrate's decision independent
of, but with due regard for, the district court's appellate decision. Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho
885,888,894 P.2d 118, 121 (1995).
Findings of fact made by the trial court will not be set aside unless they are clearly
erroneous. Rohr v. Rohr, I 18 Idaho 689,691,800 P.2d 85, 87 (1990). Thus, any findings of fact
will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial and competent evidence, even though
such evidence may be conflicting. Id.; Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 563, 944 P .2d 695,
698 (1997). Questions oflaw are reviewed on appeal freely. Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 172,
898 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995). Jurisdiction is a question of law over which the Court exercises
free review. Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,471, 903 P.2d 58, 60 (1995); State v. Barros, 131
Idaho 379,381,957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998).
The trial court's determination under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure. 12(b)(8) whether to
proceed with an action where a similar case is pending in another court is discretionary. Klaue v.
Hern, 133 Idaho 437, 988 P.2d 211 (1999); See Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd.,

129 Idaho 532, 533, 927 P.2d 925, 926 (Ct.App. 1996). This decision will not be overturned on
appeal unless the trial court abuses its discretion. Id. When a trial court's discretionary decision
is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court considers:
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(1)
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) and
whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Id. (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power, Inc., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993,
f

1000 (1991 )).
B. The District Court Erred by Dismissing the November 29, 2006 Order
Regarding Child Custody Jurisdiction Because it was an Order that was Not
Appealed From and Addressed an Issue that was Not Raised on Appeal.
The district court reversed the magistrate court's November 29, 2006 Order wherein the
magistrate court found that Idaho did not have subject matter jurisdiction over child custody
issues under the UCCJEA. (R., Vol. I, pp. 133-137.) Larry did not appeal that order, but
appealed only the February 20, 2007 Order. (R., Vol. I., pp. 75.) The Notice of Appeal filed by
Larry on March 19, 2007 provides only that Larry was appealing, "Order Re: Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, entered February 20, 2007." (Id.) Moreover, the issue of child custody
jurisdiction was not raised on appeal. Larry argued in his Appellant's Brief that Idaho had
subject matter jurisdiction over the issues of "property and debt, divorce, child support and
spousal maintenance." (R., Supp. Vol. I, p. 94.) Larry did not argue that Idaho had subject
matter jurisdiction over custody issues. The district court erred by reversing the November 29,
2006 Order because the issue of child custody subject matter jurisdiction was not before the
court on appeal. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(u)(l) provides,
The scope of appellate review on an appeal to the district court
shall be as follows:
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(1) Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district
court, not involving a trial de novo, the district court shall review
the case on the record and determine the appeal as an appellate
court in the same manner and upon the same standards of review as
an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the
statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the
Supreme Court.
This Court has held that it will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. KEB
Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 690, 696 (2004). In this case, the
November 29, 2006 Order was not appealed from nor was the issue of child custody jurisdiction
raised on appeal.
C. Idaho Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA.
1. The district court erred by relying on the Hopper decision as grounds for

reversing the child custody jurisdiction determination under the UCCJEA.

The district court relied solely on this Court's decision in Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho
624, 167 P.3d 761 (2007) in reversing the November 29, 2006 Order and the February 20, 2007
Order, as well as denying Claudia's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. The Hopper decision is not
applicable to the facts of this case because Idaho does not have subject matter jurisdiction under
the UCCJEA and therefore cannot make any child custody determinations.
In Hopper, the mother unilaterally relocated from Idaho to Montana with the parties'
infant child and filed for divorce. It was determined early in the proceedings that the divorce
action would be litigated in Idaho because Idaho had jurisdiction as the Court stated, "The
Montana actions were consolidated and eventually dismissed on August 14, 2003 in deference to
Idaho's jurisdiction over the matter." Hopper, 144 Idaho at_, 167 P.3d at 762 (emphasis
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added). In another recent case, Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 187 P.3d 1234 (2008), the
parties had been residing in Idaho before the wife fled to Oregon and sought a protection order.
The Idaho and Oregon courts then agreed that jurisdiction was proper in Idaho. Schultz, 187
P.3d at 1234. Therefore, a determination was made, after conferring with the Oregon court, that
Idaho had child custody jurisdiction. In this case however, Idaho does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over child custody and cannot make any custody determinations under the UCCJEA.
On November 29, 2006, the magistrate court entered an Order, after holding a telephonic
hearing with the New York court, and determined that New York and not Idaho is the "home
state." (R., Vol. I, pp. 51-52.) The court also found that New York and not Idaho had the most
significant contacts under the UCCJEA.

(Id.)

The district court erred in reversing the

magistrate's November 29, 2006 Order on the basis of the Hopper decision because Idaho does
not have jurisdiction over custody issues like the court did in Hopper. Moreover, the district
court never addressed the UCCJEA or explained how Idaho had subject matter jurisdiction over
child custody issues.
Secondly, the Hopper case is further inapplicable to this case because Larry and Claudia
stipulated to all custody matters in New York. ( R., Vol. I, pp. 155-172.) The parties stipulated
to a custody schedule on November 13, 2007 and an Order was entered on December 18, 2007.
(Id.)

Recently, this Court distinguished the Hopper case in Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882,
173 P.3d 1141 (2007). In Navarro, the parties had one minor child, but were never married.
Without giving notice to the father, the mother relocated to Nevada with their minor child.
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Mother then filed for a temporary restraining order in Nevada and the father filed a custody
petition in Idaho. Later, the parties stipulated to an interim custody order in December of 2004
and an order was subsequently entered awarding mother legal and physical custody. The final
custody decree was entered on March 3 I, 2006. On appeal, the father argued that the court erred
by treating mother's unilateral move from Idaho to Nevada as a factor in the physical custody
award rather than a determinative condition and argued that under Hopper it violated his rights.
This Court rejected his argument because he was able to maintain a relationship with the child
via the custody order that was entered by stipulation and therefore his equal rights were not
prejudiced. In this case, the parties have stipulated to custody and therefore Larry's equal rights
have not been violated and Hopper is inapplicable.
The district court erred by reversing the November 29, 2006 Order; it failed to address
the UCCJEA in its decision and made no finding that Idaho had subjection matter jurisdiction
over custody issues.
2. Home State Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA.

Idaho and New York 3 have enacted the UCCJEA. Idaho Code§ 32-II-201 provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in section 32-11-204, Idaho
Code, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial
child custody determination only if:
(1) This state is the home state of the child on the
date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home
state of the child within six (6) months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from
3

See Domestic Relations Law, Article 5-A.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1719559-001/365146 SWW/MEW/jib 9/25/,008

this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to
live in this state;
(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under
paragraph( I) of this subsection, or a court of the home state of
the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that this state is the more appropriate forum under section 3211-207 or 32-11-208, Idaho Code, and:
(A) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least
one (1) parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant
connection with this state other than mere physical presence;
and (B) Substantial evidence is available in this state
concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal
relationships;

l
I

IDAHO CODE§ 32-11-201. "This section provides mandatory jurisdictional rules for the original
child custody proceeding." UCCJEA Official Comment § 204. The Official Comments further
states:

It should also be noted that since jurisdiction to make a child
custody determination is subject matter jurisdiction, an agreement
of the parties to confer jurisdiction on a court that would not
otherwise have jurisdiction under this Act ineffective.
UCCJEA Official Comment § 204.
The state of Idaho does not meet the definition of the "home state" as set forth in Idaho
Code§ 32-11-201(a)(I). The UCCJEA defines "home state" as follows:
[T]he State in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting
as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before
the commencement of a child-custody proceeding. In the case of a
child less than six months of age, the term means the State in
which the child lived from birth with any of the persons
mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the
mentioned persons is part of the period.
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Idaho Code § 32-11-102(g). Claudia and the children moved to Idaho for the first time from
Buffalg, New York, on July 18, 2006. (R., Vol. I, p. 21,

,r 3.)

Prior to moving to Idaho, the

parties and their children had resided in Buffalo, New York for approximately eleven (11) years.
(R., Vol. I, p. 174, ,r 3.) Pursuant to LC.§ 32-ll-20l(a)(l), Idaho was not the "home state" at

the time the proceedings were filed, nor was it ever the "home state," as the children had only
lived in Idaho for a total of approximately two and one half months.
New York is the "home state" under this provision, because New York was the "home
state" of the children "within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this
State." Idaho Code§ 32-11-201(a)(I).
While there does not appear to be any case law in Idaho directly on point, other
jurisdictions that have adopted the UCCJEA have addressed this issue. The issue presented in
this case was addressed by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Welch-Doden v. Roberts, 202 Ariz.
201, 42 P.3d 1166 (2002). In Welch-Doden, the mother and father were married in Arizona in
1996. They later relocated to Oklahoma and their first child was born there in 1999. After the
child was born, the mother and child moved back and forth between Arizona and Oklahoma.
Mother asserted that she and her husband intended to resume their residence in Arizona. On her
last return to Arizona, mother claims that she was waiting for the father to join her. When he did
not, she filed for divorce.
The timetable of the child's residence since birth until the filing of the petition was as
follows:
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Oklahoma from birth on April 28, 1999 and for the next seven and
one-half months (April 1999-December 1999); Arizona for three
months (December 1999-March 2000); Oklahoma for six months
(March 2000-September 2000); Arizona for the four months prior
to the filing of the petition (September 2000-January 25, 2001). At
all times, the child was with its mother.
Welch-Doden, 202 Ariz. at 203, 42 P.3d at 1168.

Mother filed for dissolution and custody on January 25, 2001 in Arizona. On February 8,
2001, two days after being served with notice of the Arizona petition, father filed a petition for
divorce and custody in Oklahoma. On March 7, 2001, father appeared specially in Arizona to
move to dismiss the Arizona petition for lack of jurisdiction. An evidentiary hearing was held on
August 21, 2001. After hearing from both sides and conferring with the Oklahoma trial judge,
the trial judge ruled that Oklahoma had home state jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA. The
trial judge determined Oklahoma had been the child's home state within the six months before
the petition was filed (but not the home state for the six-month period immediately prior to the
filing). The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining:
Given the fundamental purpose of the UCCJEA to establish
certainty of home state jurisdiction, it is clear to us that § 251031 (A)(l) acts to enlarge and modify the definition of home state
under§ 25-1002(7)(a). We hold that "home state" for purposes of
determining initial jurisdiction under § 25-1031 (A)(l) is not
limited to the time period of "six consecutive months immediately
before the commencement of a child custody proceeding[.]" A.R.S.
§ 25-1002(7)(a). Instead, the applicable time period to determine
"home state" in such circumstances is "within six months before
the commencement of the [child custody] proceeding." A.R.S. §
25-1031 (A)(l ). This interpretation promotes the priority of home
state jurisdiction that the drafters specifically intended.
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Welch-Doden, 202 Ariz. at 209, 42 P.3d at 1174.

While the facts in the case at hand are not as complicated as those set forth in WelchDoden, the timetable presented here is clear. Prior to moving to Idaho on July I 8, 2006, the

children and their mother lived in New York for approximately eleven (1 I) years. (R., Vol. I, p.
174, ,r 3.) The parties and their children had not even lived in Idaho for six months, therefore,
pursuant to the UCCJEA, the magistrate court properly looked back to the six months period
prior to the commencement of Larry's divorce action to determine if there was a state that would
qualify as the home state. Within the six months preceding the divorce action there was a "home
state" because the parties and their children had lived in New York, within the last six months,
for a period of approximately eleven (11) years.
In Stephens v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 33 l Mont. 40, 128 P.3d 1026 (2006), the
parties were married in Montana and had two children between the years 1999 and 2002. In
2002, the family moved to Arkansas and lived there for approximately three years. In the spring
of 2005, the family returned to Montana. The parties took steps at that time that would imply
that they intended the move to Montana to be permanent, like enrolling their children in school,
obtaining driver's licenses and opening a bank account.
In August of 2005, approximately three months later, the mother left with the two
children and returned to Arkansas. Father filed for divorce in Montana on August I 0, 2005. The
Montana Supreme Court first looked at the definition of "home state" as defined in the UCCJEA
that provides:
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"Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent
or a person acting as parent for at least 6 consecutive months
immediately before the commencement of a child custody
proceeding. In the case of a child less than 6 months of age, the
term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any
of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of
the mentioned persons is part of the period.
M.C.A. § 40-7-103(7). This is the same definition as the Idaho and New York statutes.
The Montana Supreme Court looked first to the purpose behind the UCCJEA and
explained that the UCCJEA sought to increase uniformity in state laws regarding jurisdiction and
custody matters and to avoid disputes between competing jurisdictions. The court stated, "The
drafters intended that the UCCJEA should be construed to promote one of its primary purposes
of avoiding jurisdictional competition and conflict that flows from hearings in competing states
when each state substantively reviews subjective factors, such as 'best interests.'" Stephens, 128
P.3d at 1029. The court ultimately found that Arkansas was the home state, explaining:
"home state" for purposes of detennining initial jurisdiction under
§ 40-7-201(1), MCA, is not limited to the time period of "6
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a
child custody proceeding."
The applicable time period to
determine "home state" in such circumstances should be "within 6
months before the commencement of the [child custody]
proceeding. Section 40-7-20l(a)(l). This interpretation promotes
the priority of home state jurisdiction that the drafters of the
UCCJEA specifically intended.
Stephens, supra. It further explained:

[Mother] removed the children from Montana in August of 2005,
thereby stopping the six-month clock needed to establish Montana
as the "home state for purposes of the UCCJEA. The District
Court and [Father] put much stock in the fact that the parties took
steps that would imply their intention to make a permanent move
to Montana in 2005. Regardless of their intention, however, the
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fact remains that Brenda removed the children from Montana in
August 2005 and returned them to their "home state" of Arkansas
at that time. Thus, Arkansas was the children's "home state" under
the UCCJEA when the family came to Montana in May 2005, and
remained their "home state under the UCCJEA when they returned
to Arkansas in August of 2005.
(Id.) The facts in Stephens parallel the facts in this case. The magistrate court properly looked

back six months prior to the commencement of the action and determined that New York was the
"home state" pursuant to the UCCJEA.
3. Significant Contacts Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA.

The magistrate court further found that not only was New York the "home state," but in
the alternative New York had jurisdiction under LC. § 32-11-201(2) because it had the most
significant contacts. Pursuant to Idaho Code §32-11-201(2), the Court must consider:

(A) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one
(1) parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant
connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
(B) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the
child's care, protection, training and personal relationships;
IDAHO CODE§ 32-201(2).
The primary purpose of the UCCJEA is to avoid jurisdictional competition and is
designed to prevent the significant contacts analysis and prefers a "home state" analysis in order
to avoid disputes exactly like these. Nonetheless, even under a significant contacts approach,
Claudia and the children have more significant contacts in New York than in Idaho.
Both Lan-y and Claudia submitted affidavits to the magistrate court regarding significant
contacts. The contacts set forth by Lan-y related to his personal contacts with the state of Idaho,
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rather than the contacts of Claudia and the children. It is simply not plausible that the parties and
their children could have established more contacts with a state in which they had resided for
only two and one-half months as opposed to New York where they had lived for eleven years.
The parties and their children have long-established friendships, employment history,
educational history, medical history, and residential history in New York. (R., Vol. I, pp. 24-38.)
The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by alternatively finding that New York had
subject matter jurisdiction over custody issues under the significant contacts analysis.
D. The District Conrt Erred by Reversing the Magistrate's Dismissal Under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8).

The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the remaining issues
in Larry's divorce action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8). The district court
made no finding that the magistrate court abused its discretion.

The district court erred in

reversing the February 20, 2007 Order.
Rule l 2(b )(8) allows a party to raise as a defense the fact that "another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause." In light of other litigation, it is within the court's
discretion whether to proceed with the case. See Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho
905,908,684 P.2d 307,310 (Ct.App.1984), overruled on other grounds by, NBC Leasing Co. v.
R&T Farms, Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987). When considering an Idaho Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) motion to dismiss, only "two tests govern the determination of whether
a lawsuit should proceed where a similar lawsuit is pending another court." Klaue v. Hern, 133
Idaho 437,440,988 P.2d 211,214 (1999); see also Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar, 106 Idaho 905,
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908,684 P.2d 307,310 (Ct.App. 1984). "First the court should consider whether the other case
has gone to judgment, in which event the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion may
bar additional litigation." Id. "The second test is whether the court, although not barred from
deciding the case, should nevertheless refrain from deciding it."

Id.

Furthermore, "the

determination of whether to proceed with a case where a similar case is pending elsewhere, and
has not gone to judgment, is discretionary, and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that
discretion." Id.
"When a court is called upon to enforce a foreign judgment, it may inquire into the
jurisdictional basis of the foreign court's decree to determine whether full faith and credit must
be accorded." Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 65 P.3d 502 (2003); Schwilling v. Horne, l 05
Idaho 294, 297, 669 P.2d 183, 186 (1983)(quoting Underwriters Nat'! Assurance Co. v. North
Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 102 S.Ct. 1357, 71
L.Ed.2d 558 (1982)( emphasis added).
The magistrate court was not called upon to enforce the New York court's order nor was
Claudia seeking to register the order in Idaho.

Rather the magistrate court only needed to

determine whether there was pending litigation in another state that addressed the same issues.
Specifically, the factors that the court is to consider on a Rule 12(b)(8) motion are as follows:
In deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case when there
is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, a trial court must evaluate the identity of the real parties in
interest and the degree to which the claims or issues are similar.
The trial court is to consider whether the court in which the matter
already is pending is in a position to determine the whole
controversy and to settle all the rights of the parties. Additionally,
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the court may take into account the occasionally competing
objectives and judicial economy, minimizing costs and delay to
litigants obtaining prompt and orderly disposition of each claim or
issue, and avoiding potentially inconsistent judgments.

Diet Ctr., Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23, 855 P.2d 481, 483-84 (Ct. App. 1993).
The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by granting Claudia's motion to dismiss.
On February 20, 2007, the magistrate court entered its order granting Claudia's dismissal
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8). (R., Vol. I, pp.72-74.) As set forth above,
Rule l 2(b)(8) allows a party to raise as a defense the fact that "another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause." In light of other litigation, it is within the court's discretion
whether to proceed with the case. See Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., l 06 Idaho 905, 908, 684
P.2d 307,310 (Ct.App.1984), overruled on other grounds by, NBC Leasing Co. v. R&T Farms,

Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987). Additionally, another important factor is "whether the
other court has already exercised jurisdiction." Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd.,
129 Idaho 532,534 927 P.2d 925,928 (1996).
Considering the foregoing, the magistrate court reviewed the appropriate factors and
found:
Ms. Johnson has moved with the children back to New York. (R.,
Supp., Vol. II, p. 176, Tr., p. 4, L. 10-1 l.)

Ms. Johnson did file first in New York. .. (R., Supp., Vol. II, p. 176,
Tr., p. 30, L. 16-19.)
And what I don't want to happen is to have two courts in two
separate states issuing two separate orders on who has jurisdiction.
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If New York doesn't have jurisdiction over you and this gets set
aside, you certainly can come back in here and do that. (R., Supp.,
Vol. II, p. 176, Tr., p. 31, L. 8-12.)

An order's already issued in New York saying they have
jurisdiction over everything. (R., Supp., Vol. II, p. 176, Tr., p. 30,
L. 16-19.)

I did make the finding after having a hearing with Justice
O'Donnell and the attorneys in New York and the attorneys here
that I did not have child custody jurisdiction. Thus for, I didn't
have subject matter jurisdiction either according to the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. (R., Supp., Vol. II, p. 176, Tr., p.
30, L. 19-24.)

The magistrate court considered the relevant legal factors under Rule 12(b)(8) and acted
within the bounds of its discretion by considering the factors above. The magistrate reached its
decision through an exercise of reason. Therefore, the district court erred in reversing this order
and further made no finding how the magistrate court abused its discretion.
E. The District Court Erred by Denying the Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.

The district court denied Claudia's Motion to Dismiss Appeal and cited to the Hopper
decision. It is not clear how Hopper applies to the issues presented on the Motion to Dismiss the
Appeal. The Motion to Dismiss Appeal was brought on the grounds of mootness.
Larry's appeal to the district court alleged that the New York court did not have personal
jurisdiction over him and therefore the Idaho Court improperly deferred to the New York court's
decision. Larry's personal jurisdiction argument is moot because after he filed his appeal to the
district court on March 19, 2007, he entered a voluntary appearance in New York on April 20,
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2007. Larry's New York attorney, Keith Kadish, entered not one, but two appearances in New
?

York, thereby subjecting Larry to the jurisdiction of the New York court. The first Notice of
Appearance entered on December 1, 2006, clearly provides that Larry was appearing on the
issues of custody and support. (R., Vol. I, p. 106.) The second appearance, entered on April 20,
2007 is a general appearance and thereby further waives personal jurisdiction as to all of the
remaining property and support issues. (R., Vol. I, pp. 107-08.)
The court may dismiss an appeal when it appears that only a moot question is involved.
Downingv. Jacobs, 99 Idaho 127, 578 P.2d 243 (1978); citing Tryon v. Baker, 94 Idaho 222,485

P.2d 964 (1972); Graves v. Berry, 35 Idaho 498, 207 P. 718 (1922).

"In making this

determination, this court may properly consider facts arising after the entry of the judgment
appealed. Downing, 99 Idaho at 128,578 P.2d at 244.
"The voluntary appearance of a party or service of any pleading by the party, except as
provided herein, constitutes voluntary submission to the personal jurisdiction of the court."
I.R.C.P. 4(i). The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated, "If a jurisdictional objection was not
asserted by motion or answer at the time of the appearance, the objection was waived."
Donaldson v. Donaldson, JI 1 Idaho 951, 954, 729 P.2d 426, 429 (Ct. App. 1986). The law in

New York is the same as Idaho, "However, the defendants appeared voluntarily and failed to
object to jurisdiction in their answer. This precludes them from raising a defense at this time."
Roseman v. McAvoy, 92 Misc.2d 1063, 1064, 401 N.Y.S.2d 988, 989 (1978). Therefore, as a

matter of law, Larry voluntarily appeared in the New York case and voluntarily submitted to the
personal jurisdiction of the court.
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The defendant appears in an action when he answers, demurs, or gives the plaintiff
written notice of his appearance, or when an attorney gives notice of appearance for him."
Pittenger v. A.L. G. Barnes Circus, 39 Idaho 807, 230 P. 1011 (1924). A general appearance is

the equivalent of a "voluntary" appearance. This Court has explained in detail:
The service of the summons confers the court with
personal jurisdiction over a party. Engleman v. Milanez, 137
Idaho 83, 84, 44 P .3d I 138, I 139 (2002). The filing of a notice
of appearance by a party is equivalent to the service of process
upon that party. Id. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) provides
that the voluntary appearance or service of any pleading by a
party constitutes submission to the personal jurisdiction of the
Id. Thus, the voluntary appearance by a party is
court.
equivalent to service of the summons upon that party. Id.
Rule 4(i) further provides that the voluntary appearance o
service of any pleading by a party constitutes voluntary
submission to the personal jurisdiction of the court 'except as
provide herein.' It then lists three exceptions. First, filing a
motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or (5) does not constitute a
voluntary appearance. Second, filing a motion asserting any
other defense does not constitute a voluntary appearance if it is
joined with a motion under Rule 12(b)(2)(4) or (5). Finally, filing
a pleading and defending the lawsuit does not constitute a
voluntary appearance if it was done after the trial court has denied
the party's motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5).
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 318, 78 P.3d 379, 385 (2003). The Notice of Retainer and

Appearance filed by Larry's attorney, Keith I. Kadish, Esq., on April 20, 2007, does not contain
any assertion that the court lacks personal jurisdiction. In fact, the Notice of Retainer and
Appearance specifically provides, "Please note that the Defendant is seeking relief outlined in
the attached Schedule A." The Schedule A attached the appearance provides that Larry is
requesting the New York Court to grant the following relief:
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Divorcing the parties and dissolving the marital relationship
which has heretofore existed.

!

Awarding Defendant exclusive use and occupancy of the
marital residence.
Awarding the Defendant exclusive use and occupancy of
the contents of the marital residence.
Awarding Defendant equitable distribution of marital
property, including a distributive award to Defendant if
required or appropriate to effect such equitable distribution.
Declaring Defendant's separate property.
Granting each party the right to resume the use of any
maiden name or other pre-marriage surname.
Awarding the Defendant such other and further relief as to
the court may seem just and proper, together with the costs
and disbursements of this action.
(R., Vol. I, pp. 107-08.) Not only does Larry not object to the New York court's jurisdiction
over him, but he is requesting the New York court to grant him specific relief. Clearly, the
general appearance was voluntary and therefore Larry has voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of New York.
The general appearance is binding on Larry. "Idaho appellate courts have long held that
civil litigants choose their attorneys and cannot avoid the consequences of their attorney's
actions." Dep't ofHealth and Welfare v. Conley, 132 Idaho 266,271,971 P.2d 332,337 (1999),
citing Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Professional Ass 'n, 107 Idaho 1, 2, 684 P.2d 978, 979

(1984).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 3019559-00 l/365 I46 SWW/MEW/jib 9/25/2008

r

The first Notice of Appearance entered on December 1, 2006, which limited Larry's
appearance to child support to custody and support, was superseded by the April 20th general
appearance.
The Notice of Appearance filed on December 1, 2006, does not challenge the court's
jurisdiction; rather it limits the appearance to custody and support issues. The second Notice of
Appearance filed on April 20, 2006, after Larry filed his appeal in Idaho, not only does not
challenge the jurisdiction of the court, but in no way limits the appearance. Furthermore, as set
forth above, it clearly provides that Larry is seeking relief from the New York court on property
issues. Therefore, the second general appearance waives any previous limited appearance.
While there does not appear to be authority in Idaho directly on point, a decision from the
Supreme Court of Vermont is instructive. In State v. Van Aelstyn, 917 A.2d 471 (Vt. 2007),
which was a criminal case involving a waiver of counsel. The defendant filed two notices of pro
se appearance articulating specific limits on his appearance, expressly stating in the second
notice that he did not intend to waive his right to counsel.

"Defendant's third notice of

appearance included no such limit to his appearance or reservation of his right to counsel.
Defendant simply stated that he was entering his appearance pro se and requested that copies of
all filings be sent to him. The absence of any limitation in the November 29 notice, particularly
when defendant had placed limitations in the two previous notices of appearance, reflects a
voluntary intent to proceed prose." Van Aelstyn, 917 A.2d at 475 (emphasis added). This same
rationale is applicable in this case. The fact that Larry filed a subsequent general appearance,
after previously filing a limited one, that set forth specific relief he is requesting from the court
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shows that he intended to proceed in New York and voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
that court.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Claudia respectfully requests this Court to grant her appeal and affirm the magistrate
court's November 29, 2006 Order and February 20, 2007 Order and reverse the district court's
decision that reversed these orders.

DATED:

September 30, 2008

COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP

By:

~\rif
STANEYW. WELSH
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 30th day of September, 2008, a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing instrument was served upon:
James A. Bevis
Jennifer M, Schindele
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960 Broadway, Ste. 220
Boise, Idaho 83701

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 3319559-001/365146 SWW/MEW/jib 9/25/2008

~

D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Courier
Facsimile
Email

